

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS

ACADEMIC YEAR 1971

PANEL INFORMATION, COURSE 4

PANEL NO. 1                      MILITARY ROLE AND CAPABILITIES                      7 JANUARY 1971  
   IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INTRODUCTION.

a. The military services and other agencies of the Department of Defense continue to play principal, perhaps predominant, roles in US internal defense and development efforts. A major problem, however, has been to define these roles in terms of traditional military functions, considering that in an insurgency such as Vietnam, the military has been normally tasked to perform missions far transcending those traditionally assigned to it because other agencies have not had the required capabilities. The military is faced with the dilemma of how to prepare to carry out these missions in the future, if required, without exceeding its assigned terms of reference and degrading its capabilities to carry out other vital tasks.

b. Although the US military may ultimately be called upon to counter insurgent war by commitment of combat forces, this role is often the least desirable and least effective form of internal defense and development operations. Neither the national policy nor urgent internal priorities will allow commitment of US combat forces in other than the most critical situations. More important, however, is the fact that insurgencies or insurgent wars are fought better by indigenous than foreign forces. There is considerable truth to the contention that internal defense and development operations have failed when US combat forces must be committed.

c. Therefore, the US military role in internal defense and development operations will normally have to exploit those measures short of committing US combat forces. Such measures would likely include advisory assistance, training assistance, and military sales, and can include grant aid and direct logistical support. There are a number of other intriguing possibilities which cannot be discussed in an unclassified text. The challenge facing today's military strategist is how to perfect these measures as well as developing new ones which can successfully counter insurgent wars without committing US combat forces.

d. To carry out this role as well as that of committing US combat forces in critical situations, the military establishment must develop a thorough understanding of both insurgent warfare and the strategy and tactics required to defeat it. This understanding is fundamental not only to possible US operations, but to assisting other nations in helping themselves. In other words, all military services must maintain

immediately available a broadly based capability of expertise, training, weaponry, technology, and organization which can be employed in both the noncombat and combat responses to an insurgent threat--and maintain this capability in a form which will not seriously degrade their capabilities to deter or defeat other less likely, but more immediately dangerous, forms of war.

2. OBJECTIVE. To understand the military role and capabilities in internal defense and development and the problems relating to their adequate definition.

3. SCOPE. This panel will include:

a. Discussion of how the defense establishment and the respective military services view their roles and capabilities in internal defense and development.

b. Analysis of problems relating to adequate definition of these roles both within the defense establishment itself and between other government agencies, such as State, USAID, USIS, and CIA.

c. Evaluation of how effectively the military services have used their capabilities to carry out their jobs in internal defense and development in the past.

d. Discussion of what measures are being taken or could be taken by the US military services to improve these capabilities for future internal defense and development operations.

4. ADDITIONAL FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION.

a. Can the military establishment effectively prepare to counter future insurgent wars in the present context of hazily defined roles and missions relating to internal defense and development?

b. Is the present Vietnam involvement of the military in functions not normally its responsibility likely to be repeated in future internal defense and development operations, or is, as many suggest, Vietnam a peculiar case?

c. How can the military establishment prepare itself for the wide variety of missions--many of a nonmilitary nature--which it might be called upon to perform in future internal defense and development operations?

d. What new or modified techniques might the military establishment employ to assist other nations to help themselves in conducting internal defense and development operations?

PANEL NO. 2

CONSULTANT PANELS

8 JANUARY 1971

1. INTRODUCTION. During the Insurgent Warfare Seminar, plans will be developed outlining actions to be taken over the next five years to either subvert or restore a climate of order to selected countries. During the panel discussions, area specialists will present information to stimulate thoughts on methods to stabilize the countries under study.

2. OBJECTIVE. To become familiar with current policies and conditions in selected countries and to complete research in preparation for determining actions to be taken during the Insurgent Warfare Seminar.

3. SCOPE. Factors to be included during the discussion of each country are:

a. US interests and objectives.

b. Capabilities and operations of the US State Department, the United States Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

c. Importance and effectiveness of US governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations in furthering US policy.

d. Economic conditions.

e. Sociopolitical conditions.

f. Status of host country internal security forces.

g. Status of insurgent forces.

4. ATTENDANCE SCHEDULE.

a. 0830-1000

Bliss Hall: Committees 8, 9, and 10 (Ethiopia)  
ALC: Committees 14, 15, and 16 (Indonesia)

b. 1015-1145

Bliss Hall: Committees 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Thailand)  
ALC: Committees 5, 6, and 7 (Guatemala)  
Upton Hall: Committees 11, 12, and 13 (Brazil)

c. 1330-1450

Room A301: Committees 1 and 2 (Thailand)  
Room B303: Committees 5 and 6 (Guatemala)  
Room B323: Committees 8 and 9 (Ethiopia)  
Room C329: Committees 11 and 12 (Brazil)  
Room B207: Committees 14 and 15 (Indonesia)

d. 1510-1630

Room A325: Committees 3 and 4 (Thailand)  
Room B319: Committee 7 (Guatemala)  
Room C311: Committee 10 (Ethiopia)  
Room C207: Committee 13 (Brazil)  
Room C229: Committee 16 (Indonesia)